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Chapter 5
Phage–Ethics: A Lacanian Reading of Sinclair 
Lewis’s Arrowsmith
5.1  Introduction
Arrowsmith (published in 1925) is an intriguing novel for various reasons, but first 
of all because this 500–page romance is often regarded as the first real science 
novel, devoted to experimental laboratory research as a practice, a profession, an 
ideology, a worldview, a “prominent strand in modern culture” (Schorer 1961, 
p. 414), a way of life.1 Named after its key protagonist Martin Arrowsmith, it records 
an important event in the history of biomedicine: the discovery of the “bacterium–
eating” virus: the bacteriophage. But it also addresses a moral ambivalence that runs 
through biomedicine as a research field, namely the tension between the exacting 
demands of “pure” research on the one hand and its various (more or less benevo-
lent) applications in medical practice on the other. The novel stages a series of dra-
matic moral conflicts between the duties of Martin Arrowsmith as a physician 
(working for the benefit of his patients) and as a researcher (working for the benefit 
of future generations, of “humankind”), thereby practicing not one but two “impos-
sible professions”. Lewis’s lively descriptions of science communication, priority 
conflicts, funding strategies, research ethics and laboratory rivalries are still relevant 
today. First and foremost, however, the novel allows us to discern how, beneath 
biomedicine’s manifest aspiration to promote human well–being, there is a “deeper” 
impulse, a disconcerting obsession at work that may prove highly disruptive, not 
only for test animals, research subjects and patients, but also for scientists them-
selves. Biomedicine’s fuelling desire, its cupido sciendi (its will to know) is not 
predominantly to safe, but rather to control life, and the aim of my Lacanian reread-
ing reading is to bring this subliminal dimension to the surface. Lacan’s quadruped 
will guide our reading:
1 “Arrowsmith, the first major American novel to concern itself with the culture of science” 
(Doctorow 2008, p. 455/6).
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S2 (biomedical expertise) a  (the bacterium-eating factor X)
S1 (compulsion to control life) $ (the impossible profession)
 
Sinclair Lewis (who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1930) wrote 
what is perhaps his best novel in collaboration with science writer Paul de Kruif,2 a 
graduate from the University of Michigan who had worked as a bacteriologist 
(“microbe hunter”) at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York3 
and was well underway to become a prominent author himself.4 He would publish 
his (still famous) best–selling book The Microbe Hunters in 1926. Whereas Lewis 
(son of a general practitioner) was responsible for the descriptions of marital, 
domestic, professional and civic life in the United States a century ago, De Kruif 
added the scientific ingredients: the biomedical jargon and the intricate details of 
laboratory research. But he also portrayed one of the most intriguing characters of 
the book, namely Max Gottlieb: a “blend” (De Kruif 1962, p. 93, p. 102), “melange” 
(p. 109) or “amalgam” (Markel 2001, p. 372), − a Mischperson as Freud calls it 
(1900/1942, p. 299) –, of Frederick G. Novy (De Kruif’s Professor of bacteriology 
at the University of Michigan) and Jacques Loeb, the famous biologist of German–
Jewish descent (1859–1924) who joined the Rockefeller Institute in 1910 (Pauly 
1981; Fangerau 2006). Lewis and De Kruif toured the Caribbean together on a 
“literary safari” (De Kruif 1962), combining furious writing with heavy drinking, 
collecting ample materials for their masterpiece along the way.5 And while De Kruif 
offered Lewis a crash course in bacteriology, Lewis provided De Kruif with an 
apprenticeship in non–academic writing.
Arrowsmith portrays the relentless (and potentially disruptive) will to power that 
drives life science research. Whereas on the ‘manifest’ level biomedicine aspires to 
do good, there is a “mysterious and unreasoning compulsion” (p. 146) at work that 
cannot be reduced to purely altruistic motives. This is underlined by a disconcerting 
2 “To Dr. Paul de Kruif I am indebted not only for most of the bacteriological and medical material 
in this tale but equally for his help in the planning of the fable itself – for his realisation of the 
characters as living people, for his philosophy as a scientist” (Lewis 1925/2002, p. 2).
3 The Rockefeller Institute, with its “sumptuously plush research facilities”, is depicted by De 
Kruif as a “scientific emporium” (1962, p. 14).
4 Although his “dissociation experiments” (comparing virulent and attenuated streptococci) 
resulted in publications in the Journal of Experimental Medicine, he was fired by the Institute’s 
director Simon Flexner (Dr A. DeWitt Tubbs in the novel) for publishing Our Medicine Men: a 
critical journalistic review of contemporary medical practice in the U.S. (“A montage of what I’d 
seen, heard, read, felt, and experienced”, 1962, p. 35), written at night while experimenting during 
daytime. Flexner notably objected to De Kruif’s view that relentless competition rather than disin-
terested collaboration lies at the heart of scientific research.
5 Their collaboration was drenched in “epic” alcohol bouts and subsequent hang–overs. In his 
memoirs, De Kruif explains that during these “drunken combats” his assignment was “to keep our 
genius [Lewis] on this side of delirium tremens … on this side of going off a deep end – though 
there were times, mornings, when his shaky hands poured some of his Scotch onto the table and 
some into the glass.” (1962, p. 94).
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quote from Paul de Kruif (who transferred his own research ethos on Martin 
Arrowsmith) about the “nihilism” of scientific inquiry:
Why had I stopped the study of medicine and switched to bacteriology? … [What did] my 
years of cool butchery of thousands of rabbits and guinea pigs show but a lack of reverence 
for life? I was destructive. I was a nihilist, period. For me, the world was too full of people 
and animals. And having no spark of reverence for all life, I had no ethics (1962, p. 39)
To bring this “deeper” impulse to the fore, I will read the novel from a Lacanian 
angle, to come to terms with this disconcerting normative “flaw”, this death drive 
fuelling what is purported to be the “science of life”. But before explaining the 
design of this chapter more fully, let me first provide an outline of the plot.
5.2  Plot Outline
Like Lewis himself (born in Sauk Centre, Minnesota, in 1885) Martin Arrowsmith 
grows up in the American Mid–West at the turn of the century, but as a young adult, 
his biography more closely resembles that of Paul de Kruif (1890–1971). Like him, 
he is a medical student at the University of Winnemac (≡ Michigan) at Maholis (≡ 
Ann Arbor), a “factory designed to produce physicians much like the Ford Motor 
Company produces cars” (Lewis 1925/2002, p. 8). In Lacanian terms: a factory to 
produce S2-type professionals. Here, however, Martin becomes infected with the 
spirit of pure science, personified by Max Gottlieb (≡ Jacques Loeb), a Fremdkörper 
in professional medicine, because he is a professor of bacteriology rather than a 
physician, who puts his life in service of an obsession, a fatal addiction, namely 
“pure”, basic research. His goal is to synthesise antitoxins in vitro to free humanity 
from the scourge of infectious disease, but also to free laboratory researchers from 
the laborious use of test animals (as impure and unreliable models). Martin wants to 
follow in his footsteps and become a bacteriologist himself: a devotee, a believer in 
the “religion” of science.
But as he meets a female nurse (Leora) and becomes a married man, he has to 
choose between a career as a general practitioner (that will provide him with social 
respectability and an income) and the uncertainties of a life devoted to science–for–
its–own–sake. Somewhat reluctantly, he opts for the former, thus betraying his true 
calling, his truth event (the lectures by and conversations with Gottlieb), suppress-
ing his persistent feelings of discontent with heavy drinking. Martin gives in to the 
reality principle, as it were, allowing himself to become enwrapped in civic, marital 
and professional life. Yet, he keeps up his habit of spending long and lonely nights 
tinkering in his home–made laboratory. At a certain point he investigates a local 
outbreak of cattle disease, publishes his results in the Journal of Infectious diseases 
and sends a reprint to Gottlieb, who now works as a principal researcher at the 
McGurk Institute (≡ the Rockefeller Institute) in New York. After reading this arti-
cle, Gottlieb invites Martin to join him at McGurk and Martin eagerly accepts the 
invitation.
5.2  Plot Outline
122
During his (initially quite unsuccessful) research there, he coincidentally discov-
ers a strange invisible “something”, a mysterious “principle X” which destroys bac-
teria, and he decides to study it meticulously, in accordance with the rigorous 
methods of his mentor. Unfortunately, while Martin is still engrossed in his analy-
ses, experiencing serious inhibitions when it comes to putting his findings to paper, 
Felix d’Herelle of the Pasteur Institute announces his discovery of what he refers to 
as the “bacterium–eating” virus, the bacteriophage. After recovering from this seri-
ous drawback (the loss of priority), Martin is urged by Gottlieb to continue his 
phage research, but to focus on practical applications instead, using these predators 
of bacteria as “allies” in the war against disease. When the fictitious Caribbean 
island of St. Hubert is struck with bubonic plague, and McGurk is called upon for 
help, Martin is sent there (accompanied by his wife Leora and a drinking compan-
ion, the public health specialist Sondelius) to conduct a field trial designed to deter-
mine whether “phage” can effectively be employed in fighting lethal pathogens. The 
result is a moral clash between the island’s administrators (who had expected a 
life–saving doctor) and Martin’s own objective as a scientist, intent on using the 
population as “material” for his trial. Thus, he finds himself confronted with an ethi-
cal dilemma: as a physician, it is his duty to vaccinate as many inhabitants as pos-
sible, but as a researcher, he is in need of an (untreated) control group to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of his vaccine. This means: dividing the coloured, illiterate popula-
tion of a village into two equal halves: the saved and the doomed.
Initially, he remains loyal to the experimental rigour instilled in him by Gottlieb, 
but after the tragic death of both Sondelius and his wife the physician in him gains 
the upper hand and he contaminates the experiment that was supposed to bring him 
everlasting fame. He still manages to publish his results, but tampers with his sloppy 
data so as to make his story sufficiently convincing. He becomes married again, this 
time to an affluent socialite widow who kindly provides him with a lavishly equipped 
laboratory of his own. Yet, utter dislike of the social life of the New York elite, in 
combination with marital unease, presses him to leave both wife and child behind 
and to escape to the wilderness of Vermont, where, together with another disgrun-
tled colleague, he lives out his mania for “pure” research, virtually undisturbed, in 
an isolated forest cabin.
In the following sections, key dimensions of the novel will be subjected to a 
Lacanian reading, treating Martin Arrowsmith as a case study (Fallgeschichte). 
Successively, I will focus on: (a) the organisational and occupational hazards of a 
biomedical career; (b) the cupido sciendi of pure science as a “divine madness”; (c) 
Martin’s grand moment of discovery (the bacteriophage as the intrusion of the 
“real”); (d) the core medical–ethical dilemma (the bacteriologist as a physician and 
as a researcher) and (e) cabin science: Martin’s escape to a reclusive, scientific 
Walden, the novel’s final act.
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5.3  Medical Practice and Its Discontents
For young Martin Arrowsmith, becoming a doctor involves an extended process of 
socialisation into the medical profession. Although courses in bacteriology and 
immunology are indispensable ingredients of his training, they nonetheless repre-
sent something which, in essence, remains at odds with professional medicine, 
namely basic research: science for the sake of science (seeing human beings as 
research subjects rather than as patients). The pure scientist (Max Gottlieb) is an 
oddity on the campus, eager to recruit a small number of students (the “elect few”), 
− or even one single student, Martin –, luring him away from a normal professional 
career, converting him to the spirit of pure science.6 Due to Gottlieb, one could 
argue, Arrowsmith becomes a science novel, rather than a medical novel (i.e. a novel 
featuring a practicing physician).
Thus, Arrowsmith depicts a failed process of socialisation. Martin continues to 
waver between the world of medical professionals (from country doctors up to met-
ropolitan hospital surgeons) on the one hand and the international subculture of 
“pure” scientists on the other: nomads really, contemptuous of “worldly success” 
(p. 11), speaking a strange, artificial language, migrating from one laboratory to the 
next, convening at international conferences and publishing dense quantitative anal-
yses in esoteric journals. Sooner or later, Martin will have to choose between the 
“profane” world of medical practice and the “sacred” world of laboratory work, 
with McGurk, the “immaculate” laboratory, towering as the ultimate “sanctuary” of 
science (p. 310): a “Heavenly laboratory in which good scientists may spend eter-
nity in happy and thoroughly impractical research” (p. 147).
Just a few years before Arrowsmith was published, Sigmund Freud (1921/1940) 
developed his views on socialisation in Group psychology and the analysis of the 
ego (“Massenpsychologie und Ich–analyse”). How can an organised group of peo-
ple (an “organised crowd”) sustain itself in view of the fact that, for individuals, 
participation comes with a price: they must relinquish private interests and short–
term rewards to pursue distant goals that can only be collectively achieved? How 
can self-centredness, individualism and discontent in modern mass societies be 
overcome? For Freud, the key to understanding the functioning of well–organised 
groups (as opposed to unorganised groups, i.e. crowds or mobs, who are intimidat-
ing, but prone to panic) is identification. Groups need leaders: paternal figures like 
Sebastian Bloch in the previous chapter, embodying the collective ideal and 
endowed with sufficient charisma and prestige for anonymous group members to 
identify themselves with them. And this is precisely the weakness of professional 
medicine as depicted in Lewis’s novel, − and the cause of Martin’s failure. The vari-
ous father–figures (representatives of organised medicine) are relentlessly ridiculed, 
one after the other. Only Loeb escapes the pervasive atmosphere of satire.
6 Like Jacques Loeb (1859–1924), Gottlieb was a contemporary of Freud, trained by the German 
physiological school, although Freud focused on neurology and language (aphasia) and Gottlieb 
on psychophysics, before turning to immunology.
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In the early twentieth century, group behaviour had become an urgent topic. 
Societies were becoming mass societies; modern media were creating mass audi-
ences; politics had become the domain of mass movements; and even science itself 
was expanding in scope and scale: new universities were established and new types 
of scientific institutions were founded (such as the Rockefeller Institute, founded in 
1901). The question how to manage and organise large groups was not a purely 
academic one.
In Arrowsmith we see a chronic tension/collision between two types of groups 
(two types of callings), highly dependent on one another, and yet apparently mutu-
ally exclusive, namely (impure) medical practice and basic (pure) research. For 
Martin, there are many incentives for choosing a medical career: the income and 
respectability of the profession, the possibility of marriage and of upward social 
mobility, in combination with the public acknowledgement of its relevance. Yet, 
what is lacking, to a deplorable extent, are inspiring personalities. One by one the 
father–figures in Lewis’s novel (representing medicine and public health) are ridi-
culed as hypocrites, endorsing unsubstantiated claims and leading uninspiring lives. 
On top of that, Martin himself is not a good physician at all, lacking “bedside man-
ners” and communicative skills, while his drinking habits are symptomatic of his 
ambivalence: his repressed yearning for pure inquiry.
Gottlieb, by contrast, seems to stand out as a beacon of integrity, a scientific 
prophet, a window into the future. Their first meetings give rise to “imprinting”, as 
it were. No matter how hard Martin tries to “repress” his admiration for his hero, his 
exposure to Gottlieb prevents him from developing a whole–hearted commitment to 
medical practice. Indeed, although he had “given up Gottlieb–worship and his 
yearning for the laboratory … something of Gottlieb’s spirit remained” (p. 115).
Having mesmerised Martin during his lectures, and subsequently during the lab-
oratory hours they spent together, Gottlieb continues to draw Martin towards him.7 
Gottlieb considers “medical science” a contradiction in terms. He is a genuine sci-
entist, devoting his life to intellectual aspirations, willing to work excessively hard 
and to accept the risk of failure. Martin is in awe of Gottlieb, the ideal “father fig-
ure” he is looking for (Parry 2008, p. vii), an ego–ideal or intellectual conscience, 
encouraging him to work harder. Indeed, Gottlieb “indoctrinates him into the reli-
gion of a scientist” (p. viii).
Already during the very first lecture he attends, a rapport is established, and 
Martin identifies himself with his life–long mentor. The novel describes how, at the 
beginning of the lecture, Professor Max Gottlieb is about to assassinate a guinea pig 
with anthrax germs, displaying his masterful technical dexterity, claiming that 
“technique is the beginning of all science” (p. 36). As Lewis phrases it, the class was 
“a mob” (p. 35), “shuddering” (p. 36) in response to the idea that even a small sam-
ple of anthrax bacilli could easily produce a lethal infection. But Martin is simply 
enthralled by Gottlieb. Indeed: “Martin Arrowsmith already saw himself doing the 
same experiment and, as he remembered Gottlieb’s unerring fingers, his hands 
curved in imitation … He had begun, perhaps in youthful imitation of Gottlieb, to 
7 Lewis originally intended to call his novel In the shadow of Max Gottlieb (Fangerau 2006).
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work by himself in the laboratory at night” (p.  38/9). He mimics and copies 
Gottlieb’s words and gestures. And via Gottlieb, who studied with Helmholtz and 
idolises Koch, Martin extends his identification to his master’s masters.
This fascination for scientific truth hampers his professional career, causing a 
chronic sense of ambivalence: “Martin remained doubtful, he admired the insis-
tence on the physician’s immediate service to mankind, but he could not forget the 
cool ascetic hours in the laboratory” (p. 119). As a symptom of this ambivalence, he 
insists on having a makeshift laboratory of his own where he continues his habit of 
conducting experiments, usually at night, although this is barely tolerated by his 
social environment, first of all his wife. This dynamics is captured by Lacan’s 
quadruped:
S2 (medical professionalism) a  (unknown disruptive lethal factors)
S1 (the imperatives of pure science: 
Gottlieb as super-ego)
$ (divided loyalties: the worldly versus 
the “religious” calling)  
His research position at McGurk (where he joins his ego–ideal again), his dra-
matic expedition to the Caribbean and, finally, his retreat into the woods are all 
instances of a return of the repressed. Having been exposed to the quest for pure 
science, he cannot really become socialised into normal civil society any more. 
Indeed, in Arrowsmith, bacteriology is presented as an infectious affliction, spread-
ing from the laboratories of Pasteur and Koch into the United States, with research-
ers such as Gottlieb as carriers or vectors.8 As Freud argues in Group psychology 
and the analysis of the ego, there is a strong desire in infected individuals to confer 
their infection to others, for why should they alone be excluded from the benefits of 
social life and condemned to an ascetic existence of toil and hardship (p. 134)? But 
what exactly makes laboratory research so ‘infectious’ (for individuals ‘susceptible’ 
to it), so alluring?
5.4  Cupido sciendi: Pure Science as a Divine, Infectious 
Madness
Arrowsmith contains numerous descriptions of biomedical research settings, with 
racks of test–tubes, Bunsen burners, constant temperature baths, centrifuges, auto-
claves, notebooks and so on, but this in itself does not explain the fatal attraction 
8 Immunology and psychoanalysis seem comparable. There is a famous anecdote, told by Lacan 
(1966), who allegedly had it from Jung, that (as their ocean liner entered New York harbour) Freud 
gloomily told the latter that they were ‘bringing the plague’ to America. Psychoanalysis has often 
been depicted as an ‘infection’, disrupting academic life and therapeutic practice (or even society 
at large), for instance by De Kruif, who claimed that Pavlov “immunised me against the peril of 
what I came to call the ‘analism’ promulgated by Sigmund Freud, just then beginning to taint 
American psychiatry and even psychology” (1962, p. 122).
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these loci of discovery exert on individuals such as Martin. Rather, what attracts him 
in science is the aura of a quasi-religious calling. This is underlined by an impro-
vised sermon by Gottlieb, with Martin (who has just entered McGurk) “at his feet” 
(Doctorow 2008, p. 453), explaining that science, extremely demanding and error–
prone, is essentially a religion:
I make many mistakes. But one thing I keep always pure: the religion of a scientist. To be a 
scientist [is] like mysticism … it makes its victims all different from the good normal 
man… The scientist is intensely religious – he is so religious that he will not accept quarter- 
truths, because they are an insult to his faith… he is a man that all nice good–natured people 
should naturally hate! … [The authentic scientist is] the only real revolutionary… He lives 
in a cold, clear light… Not all the men who work at science are scientists. So few! … To be 
a scientist [there are] two things you must do: work twice as hard as you can, and keep 
people from using you. I will try to protect you from success … May Koch bless you! 
(292/293)
Science means perseverance, loneliness. Research had not yet evolved into the 
large-scale pre-programmed phenomenon it became today. Discoveries were made 
by solitary individuals at their benches, preferably after hours, during the night.9 
McGurk encourages individuals to pursue their goals in splendid isolation. Research 
is pure, researcher-driven, and intolerant towards the “quarter-truths” abounding in 
the real world outside the lab.
As a general practitioner struggling in the fuzzy, dreary outside world, Martin 
tried to forget about Gottlieb and his imperatives (S1 in the lower-left position), but 
his super-ego continues to haunt him like a phantom. As a doctor, Martin is deprived 
of something, − and of someone. The repressed attachment continues to cast a 
shadow10 and his ego is split into two halves: on the one hand the married, heavy 
drinking professional, on the other hand the would-be researcher, tormented by his 
intellectual conscience (his ego–ideal), failing to live up to his true vocation ($ in 
the lower-right position). His entering McGurk as a research associate entails a 
moment of euphoria and triumph, of reconciliation and atonement: a spiritual 
“inflammation”. He and Gottlieb (the “demon” of pure science) are finally on speak-
ing terms again, while Martin can overcome his paralysing dividedness ($ → S2), 
can restore his integrity (literally: his wholeness), can wholeheartedly identify him-
self with his role as researcher and constitute himself convincingly as a moral 
subject.
But in his new position, new challenges, new threats to his integrity await him, 
precisely because of the exclusiveness of the scientific calling. In Arrowsmith the 
ethos of science is described as a divine madness, θεία μανία, as Plato phrased it 
(Phaedrus, 244–256). Inside their laboratory, similar to Plato’s philosophers, scien-
tists behold a realm of truth which is invisible for untrained senses, a transcendent 
region only discernible for the initiated mind, although there are many who, after 
9 Cf. “In Betreff der intellektuellen Leistung bleibt bestehen, dass die großen Entscheidungen der 
Denkarbeit, die folgenschweren Entdeckungen und Problemlösungen nur dem Einzelnen, der in 
der Einsamkeit arbeitet, möglich sind” (Freud 1921/1940, p. 89).
10 “Der Schatten des Objekts [i.e. Gottlieb] ist auf das Ich gefallen” (Freud 1921/1940, p. 120).
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much toil and hardship, leave the field without gaining even a glimpse of this higher 
reality (248B). Because of their desire for truth, true scientists cannot sleep at night. 
They must distance themselves from the common “herd” of mankind; ignore their 
neighbours, who rebuke them for apparently having gone mad. In Arrowsmith this 
madness, rather than providing access to a “higher” realm (of ideas), as in Plato, 
allows Martin to open up a “deeper” realm of microbial life, only accessible via 
microscopes. The topology has changed: rather than striving upwards, the modern 
scientist aims to dive deeper, but a similar amount of persistence is required. Only 
those who, like Martin, persevere in their tedious, repetitive activities will experi-
ence the “joy” (p. 43), the “rapt quietude” (p. 125), the “beautiful precision and 
dullness” (p. 40) of laboratory work. They will “sink blissfully into the laboratory” 
(p. 270), “beyond sounding in their experimentation” (p. 305), so that their lab tem-
porarily becomes a “perfect world” (p. 295).
On the verge of the discovery of his “principle X”, Martin becomes completely 
absorbed in his work. He forgets about night and day, becomes unconscious of the 
world, and completely exhausts himself, until he goes literally mad: “He was com-
pletely fagged, perhaps a little insane” (p. 326). Indeed, he works himself into a 
state of “neurasthenia” ($ in the lower-right position):
Martin watched himself, in the madness of overwork, drift toward neurasthenia…From 
irritability he passed into a sick nervousness in which he missed things for which he 
reached, dropped test–tubes, gasped at sudden footsteps behind him. … Then he was 
obsessed by the desire to spell backward all the words which snatched at him from signs… 
At last Fear closed in on him. [It began] with terror of the darkness. Footsteps in the hall 
were a creeping cutthroat…. When in the street below he did actually see a man standing 
still, he was cold with panic. Every sky glow was a fire…He knew absolutely that his fears 
were absurd, and that knowledge did not at all keep them from dominating him. Till the safe 
dawn brought back a dependable world (p. 332/3)
All this is captured by the Lacanian quadruped:
S2 (pure laboratory research: the dexterous 
experimenter)
a  (the unknown, allusive factor X)
S1 (driven by a will to power, to control) $ (various symptoms due to exhaustion, self-
exploitation, workaholism, etc.)  
As a consequence of his fatigue, he suffers from a wide range of symptoms, the 
by-product (in Lacanian terms) of his devotion: insomnia, agoraphobia, claustro-
phobia, siderodromophobia (i.e. the fear of railway journeys) and, most of all, 
anthropophobia (the fear of meeting other humans), and yet he realises that, sooner 
or later, his crazy experiment will turn “from overwhelming glory into sane … rou-
tine” again (p.  335), so that S2 (the balanced, impassive agent of university dis-
course) will be restored. What is it that, during this episode of self-imposed mental 
suffering, reveals itself to him? What is this “gold” which he seems about to find 
(p. 336)?
5.4  Cupido sciendi: Pure Science as a Divine, Infectious Madness
128
5.5  The Bacteriophage as the Intrusion of the Real
Arrowsmith makes it sufficiently clear that experimental laboratory work is often-
times quite tiresome and repetitive. Researchers redo their experiments over and 
over again, under various conditions, in order to confirm and verify their results. As 
World War I is gliding into its final, most sinister Act, Martin quietly attends the 
beautiful, grapelike microbes named staphylococci which he cultivates in vitro, rep-
resenting the S2 agent of university discourse.11 All of a sudden, something com-
pletely unexpected happens, thwarting his expectations rather dramatically. What 
went wrong?
The purpose of laboratories is to keep the unexpected and disturbing at bay, 
allowing researchers to achieve maximal control over nature. The experimental set-
ting is designed to immunise experiments against disturbances and intrusions 
(noise). The real world (out there, beyond the confines of the lab) is kept at a safe 
distance. Research facilities are purified, streamlined versions of reality, devoid of 
debris, processing tiny, artificial samples of nature that can be meticulously studied, 
such as strains of bacteria in test-tubes, carefully cultivated, protected, isolated, and 
also controllable and predictable to a considerable extent, with the help of measure-
ments, technical equipment and mathematical equations.
But now, in the midst of this tedious, repetitive, quantitative work, something 
highly unusual occurs, something which cannot be ignored. “I have hit something” 
(p.  323), Martin aptly exclaims, something “at the mysterious source of life” 
(p. 321), something which is not mentioned in the manuals or journals of normal 
science. A violent, disruptive, completely unknown dimension of nature suddenly 
opens up to him. A peaceful strain of staphylococcus bacteria, which should be 
flourishing and multiplying in their flask, is suddenly missing. Instead of a colony 
of bugs, he discerns a “clearing” (p. 325). The microbes have all disappeared: a 
most uncanny situation. Under his microscope, he sees “nothing but shadows of 
what had been bacteria: thin outlines, the form still there but the substance gone; 
minute skeletons on an infinitesimal battlefield” (p. 323). While World War I is rag-
ing, Martin hovers over a perennial battlefield (existing since time immemorial) on 
the microbial level, spotting the ghostly remainders of his perished troops (with 
test–tubes turned into trenches). Something has dissolved them, wiped them out. It 
looks as if they committed “suicide” on the spot (p. 323). Something is relentlessly 
preying on these peaceful herds; something violent has entered the lab, reminiscent 
of Heraclites’s maxim that warfare (πόλεμος) is the essence of being. What is this 
intruding “something”?
Jacques Lacan would have called it the Real: something which cannot be dis-
cerned directly, but intrudes and flouts our expectations, something alien, amor-
phous, unknown and uncanny; something we were not looking for. All of a sudden, 
something is missing which should be there (something is Fort which should be 
11 “He was so absorbed in staphylolysin that he did not realise the world was about to be made safe 
for democracy. He was a little dazed when America entered the war.” (p. 315).
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Da): a researcher is suddenly deprived of his microbes. They are reduced to phan-
toms: ghostly, emptied organisms, bodies without organelles. Nothing survives the 
intruder’s attack. The Real is that which is discovered by coincidence, which resists 
the normal functioning of scientific practice (Lacan 2007, p.  29) but cannot be 
ignored any longer; something profoundly alien and “other”.12 It can only be tamed 
if embedded in the symbolical order, by identifying, naming, counting and analys-
ing it: the basic objective of university discourse, of laboratory research.13
Martin’s discovery of the bacteriophage is also a turning point in the movie ver-
sion (Ford 1931). In mid–winter,14 with Manhattan covered in snow, Martin places 
three flasks in a refrigerator, thick with bugs. Returning to his laboratory later that 
evening, unable to detach himself from his work, he discovers that in one of them, 
the bugs have completely vanished. Instead of being turbid, the fluid is clear. Under 
his microscope, which he handles with professional ease, he discovers the remnants 
of what had been a thriving colony of bugs. Nothing like this ever happened. Is it 
good or bad? Bad, because it ruins his experiment, but he quickly considers the 
option that it might be something “good”, something “better”. Bugs don’t commit 
suicide: what slaughtered them? It must be something. In fact, it turns out to be the 
greatest thing that ever happened to him. “I have found something”, he triumphantly 
exclaims, “but don’t ask me what it is”. After days of prolonged labour, Gottlieb 
glances though his notes and says: “Martin, you have a big thing here, a great thing 
… You must find out what it is … You will begin working in earnest”.
Techno–scientific artefacts create a man-made, controllable reality, but the dis-
concerting real is never completely annihilated. It persists in the folds and margins 
of the laboratory world,15 offering resistance to complete “assimilation” (Lacan 
1973, p. 65), revealing itself as a gap, a crevice, a rupture, something totally unex-
pected (Lacan 1991/2001, p.  58), unacknowledged, unnamed, unmeasured, un- 
visualised. The real is basically an intrusion, a disruption: that which resists our 
expectations. It is the “inexorable” (Lacan 2013, p. 565). As Heraclites phrased it, 
many centuries ago: real nature is wont to hide herself, but sudden revelations may 
prove quite disconcerting (Lacan 2004, p. 85 ff.). The real is that which, from the 
point of view of normal science, seems utterly “impossible” (Lacan 2011, p. 141).
Martin is confronted, not with an “object”, but rather with a gap, something 
which causes his bugs to be missing. A first important step towards  “symbolisation” 
12 The Real is not ‘reality’. The latter term refers to the world of normal experience: that which 
functions, the world as we know it, worked-over, restructured, reorganised and transformed into 
something which is sufficiently accessible and predictable: objective reality, a product of human 
culture, of science and technology most of all. A world, a techno-social ‘habitat’: to a considerable 
extent man-made. We have been working hard to transform the terrifying Real into an environment 
we may safely inhabit, in which we function. Fire, for instance, has been domesticated with the 
help of pyro–technology, but the looming threat is still there (cf. the Tower Inferno archetype).
13 During his days as a country doctor, an infectious disease flared up among farm animals, and the 
situation quickly got out of hand. Martin managed to tame the threat with the help of his makeshift 
laboratory.
14 In the novel, the discovery is made during a “fine, wide August morning” (p. 326).
15 “Le réel est à la limite de notre expérience” (Lacan 1956–1957/1994, p. 31).
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or domestication is the act of naming. Martin uses a provisional, empty signifier for 
his strange entity: “principle X”.16 It becomes his “object a” (in the upper-right posi-
tion), alluring and disconcerting, uncanny par excellence, midway between being 
and non-being, living and non-living, a condensed fragment of (or window into) the 
real. In the struggle over priority which unfolds, d’Herelle emerges victoriously, not 
only because he is the first to publish his results, but also because he gives the new 
entity a convincing name, a signifier that sticks: the virus that preys on bugs, the 
bacteriophage. By coining this signifier, which aptly conveys (in shorthand) what 
the mysterious entity actually does, he definitely makes a name for himself, and 
turns the mysterious principle into an (albeit fairly intractable) object. We see sci-
ence at work: with scientists achieving immortality by successfully adding a new 
signifier to the network of names, concepts and symbols which Lacan refers to as 
the symbolical order. By providing the weird non-object with a name, the bacterio-
phage, or “phage”, as Americans soon prefer to call it (Cairns et al. 1966), becomes 
something that can be analysed and normalised, something scientists can relate and 
refer to: equations can now be drafted; the anomaly becomes embedded in univer-
sity discourse.17
Why didn’t Martin publish his findings earlier? Because the scientific method, 
personified by Gottlieb (his epistemological conscience), prevented him from doing 
so. No preliminary results, however intriguing, even if they bring you everlasting 
fame: that is Gottlieb’s ethos. More research is always needed. As a super–ego 
(Über–Ich), Gottlieb proves too demanding. He refuses Martin to enjoy the fruits of 
his sacrifices, his late-night hours. Martin never seems to have laboured enough. 
With Gottlieb peering over his shoulder, he feels paralysed when it comes to putting 
his findings on paper. As Freud (1921/1940) phrased it, the leader of the organised 
group (the collective conscience or ego-ideal) is reluctant to grant his co-workers 
their personal triumphs, as this would set them apart from others and reward their 
striving for independence. Gottlieb already said it in his sermon: “I will try to pro-
tect you from success”. Whereas Director Tubbs (his formal superior at McGurk) 
urges Martin to hasten and publish his results, Gottlieb keeps discouraging him 
from doing so. And when the latter walks into Martin’s lab to tell him the bad news 
about d’Herelle’s publication (according to Gottlieb’s rigid standards a premature, 
16 Martin starts taking notes: “I have observed a principle which I shall temporarily call the X 
Principle” (p. 328). Indeed, “after years of stumbling he … had visions of his name in journals and 
text books; of scientific meetings cheering him. He had been an unknown among the experts of the 
Institute, but now he pitied all of them. But when he was back at his bench the grandiose aspira-
tions faded and he was … the impersonal worker. Before him, supreme joy of the investigator, new 
mountain–passes of work opened” (p. 329).
17 The discovery of the bacteriophage as an intrusion of the ‘Real’ is different from the famous 
Eureka–experience (of Archimedes and others) when pieces of a puzzle suddenly fit together and 
the missing link is found. The intrusion of the Real is something unpleasant, something we try to 
ignore or to explain away: that which does not fit our theories, enforcing itself upon us, until we 
‘give in’, forced to acknowledge that we have ‘hit’ something. This is also underscored by 
d’Herelle (1917) who explains how he isolated the ‘invisible microbe’ from the faeces of a patient 
recovering from dysentery: the unexpected finding emerges in that which is rejected, abhorred: the 
(infectious) waste.
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sloppy publication), he is ambivalent about it. Although he deplores the fact that 
Martin (and, by implication, the Institute) has lost the race over priority, the sublime 
ethic of pure science nonetheless stood its ground, rather than compromising itself 
by hastily running into print, merely to attain worldly fame (a questionable research 
practice). Martin, the researcher in the trenches as it were, is sacrificed to these lofty 
ideals. And rather than regretting his reluctance, Martin himself experiences relief 
for not having published a “premature” paper (p. 345). He doesn’t revolt against 
Gottlieb’s sinister regime: not yet, but is willing to produce more knowledge, work 
harder, even risk his life, by travelling to plague-ridden St. Hubert, where his devo-
tion to the lofty ideals of science will be put to the test even more relentlessly. Or 
should we rather see it as an escape from the laboratory, where the split between 
obligation and desire ($) had become untenable?
As was already outlined above, we may summarise these analyses with the help 
of Lacan’s dialectical scheme of “university discourse”, by inserting Lacan’s four 
symbols (S1, S2, $ and a), Lacan’s στοιχεῖα, as “variables” (in a fixed sequence) in 
the four positions in a rotating, revolving quadruped:
Agent Other (recipient)
(suppressed) Truth By-product  
University discourse puts the qualified expert (S2) in the position of the agent.
S2 a
S1 $  
The scientist (as agent: S2 in the upper-left position) is a committed, self- 
composed, ascetic researcher focussing on an exacting object (a in the upper-right 
position). Initially, this object seems a normalised, standardised, domesticated 
object: his carefully cultivated staphylococci, but due to the disconcerting intrusion 
of the real, the focus of attention shifts to something completely different (initially 
referred to as his principle X), a taxing, toxic and addictive object, claiming his full 
attention, while remaining intractable and inexorable (a in the upper-right position). 
Initially, the position of the researcher seems completely neutral and impassive, but 
the confrontation with this “object a” proves a taxing experience and reveals that 
something else (besides objectivity, precision, etc.) is at work in science as well, 
addressing scientists from beneath the bar. On certain occasions, during his “ser-
mon” for instance, Gottlieb initiates him into a basic truth, namely that science is 
actually a religion, so that the true scientist is an ascetic devotee, an adept, some-
thing of a stylite, addressed by a secret calling, a will to power (S1 in the lower–left 
position). And although research initially may seem repetitive and boring, this com-
bination (the exposure to the intractable object, which reveals the hidden impera-
tive) results in a destabilising by-product, an unexpected moment of intellectual 
jouissance, of θεία μανία, of divine madness ($ in the lower-right position), so that 
the normal relationship between an impassive subject and a domesticated object 
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gives way to the matheme of desire: $ ◊ a. And indeed, this is what forces Martin to 
flee the Rockefeller Institute and seek shelter in the Caribbean: the tension between 
impassivity and desire (between super-ego and object a, between Gottlieb and X) 
has become untenable, resulting in an experience of dividedness or Spaltung ($ in 
the lower-right position). His competitor (d’Herelle) faced a similar tension, but 
apparently decided to publish his findings prematurely, without sufficient evidence 
(controls, replications, etc.), a questionable way-out (from a normative perspective). 
This compromised his methodological integrity, but brought him everlasting fame. 
For someone like Gottlieb, however, such an eagerness to publish is a most ques-
tionable research practice.
5.6  The Medical–Ethical Dilemma (The Bacteriologist 
as a Researcher and as a Physician)
The history of the discovery of the bacteriophage is closely connected with World 
War I.  Bacterial viruses were discovered in 1915 by the English microbiologist 
F.W. Twort, who had to discontinue his research because of the war effort. Two 
years later, in 1917, the phage was discovered for the second time18 by French–
Canadian Felix d’Herelle at the Pasteur Institute. In d’Herelle’s original publication, 
he calls the bacteriophage a potential panacea, a “microbe of immunity”. Therapeutic 
trials proved unsuccessful, however, and phage therapy (the use of phage as a bac-
terium–killer, as a soldier in the war against infectious diseases) eventually gave 
way to more effective means: penicillin and other antibiotics (Dublanchet and 
Bourne 2007).19
Thus, the bacteriophage moved from medicine to pure science and became 
essentially a lab organism: a tool for basic research in molecular biology. As such, 
it achieved world-renown through the work of Max Delbrück at Caltech (Pasadena) 
who employed it as the “hydrogen atom of biology”, as a “minimal organism”, 
albeit too minimal for the word “organism” to apply. His Phage summer course at 
Cold Spring Harbor20 put young James Watson on the road to success (Watson 
1966). In Lewis’s novel, phage research is still in its earliest, applicatory stage. With 
De Kruif providing the necessary scientific details, Arrowsmith follows history 
quite closely, as if d’Herelle and Arrowsmith really were contemporaries, stumbling 
18 “Perhaps independently, perhaps not” (Stent 1966, p. 3). The originality of d’Herelle’s discovery 
is sometimes questioned.
19 “By the middle of the 1930s … the widely propagandized control of bacterial diseases by means 
of bacteriophages had failed to materialize” (Stent 1966, p. 5). This may change, however, as new 
ways of using anti-microbial viruses are currently under development: a revival of d’Herelle’s 
approach (Keen 2012). Dublanchet and Bourne (2007) likewise argue that, in view of increased 
antibiotic resistance, phage therapy may become topical again.
20 Pasadena (Los Angeles) and Cold Spring Harbor: the “Mecca and Medina” of phage–research 
(Cairns et al. 1966, p. ix).
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over bacterial viruses at different locations (Paris and New York) more or less at the 
same time.
Seeing the struggle for priority lost,21 Gottlieb urges Martin to reorient his agenda 
towards applied research. An outbreak of bubonic plague in the Lesser Antilles pro-
vides him with a perfect opportunity to test his phage in vivo. His motives are scien-
tific rather than medical, however, and he sets off on an expedition which is not 
meant to save lives, but rather to produce a landmark publication. He wants to use 
humans instrumentally, in order to understand the phage. For him, human beings 
(coloured, illiterate inhabitants of a Caribbean island) are living test-tubes as it 
were. So far, the bacteriophage had been a laboratory artefact. Time had come to test 
his principle X in an outdoor setting, exposing it to the reality principle as it were. 
Bacterial viruses were still untried in the real world outside the lab. Will the vaccine 
work in the messy and complex environment called reality? The inhabitants of St. 
Hubert are seen as research subjects rather than suffering patients. The population 
of a remote village (providing optimal conditions for a field trial) is divided into two 
samples: the experimental condition (receiving the phage vaccine) and the control 
group (denied the life–saving serum and treated with traditional methods) – a strat-
egy which Pasteur and his followers had successfully adopted in their experiments 
with cattle (Zwart 2008a, p  175 ff.).22 Indeed, the experiment (purportedly con-
ducted for the benefit of mankind, but primarily designed for the prestige of 
McGurk) is performed by Americans at the expense of coloured, native human 
“bodies” (Lynch 2000). But as the phage vaccine begins to show results, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to uphold the experimental design in practice. This again 
reflects the dynamics of university discourse:
S2 (experimentalism: extrapolation) a (phage therapy: will phages kill lethal bugs?)
S1 (methodological imperatives: epistemic super-ego) $ (normative collision between medicine and 
research)  
Initially, Martin is bent on extrapolating his phage research to the outside envi-
ronment, conducting high-quality research which is sufficiently robust (method-
ologically speaking) to render (friendly but powerless) doctors obsolete for good. In 
the end, however, he acknowledges that he is “too human to be a satisfactory experi-
menter”. The panic–stricken controls (the anonymous indigenous masses) secretly 
begin to move over to the experimental sample, and finally, due to the death of 
Martin’s two most significant others (Western individuals with a name and a face, 
21 While the conflict over priority between Twort and d’Herelle is still a matter of dispute among 
historians, the Arrowsmith–d’Herelle conflict resurged in the struggle over priority that unfolded 
in the 1980s between Robert Gallo (of the National Cancer Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, who 
also did research on viral pathogens in the Caribbean) and Luc Montagnier (of the Pasteur Institute) 
over the discovery of HIV.
22 “There may have been in the shadowy heart of Max Gottlieb a diabolic insensitivity to … suffer-
ing mankind. He who had lived to study the methods of immunising mankind against disease had 
little interest in actually using those methods” (p. 365).
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namely Sondelius and Leora),23 Martin becomes aware of the disruptive logic of 
“pure” biomedical research. The experimental method may endanger rather than 
safeguard life. He decides to give his phage vaccine to everybody, ignoring Gottlieb’s 
instructions (his inflexible ego-ideal, summoning him from a distance, from beneath 
the bar). The objective is reversed: from conducting experiments (knowledge pro-
duction) to beneficence (saving lives). With a scientific conscience weakened by 
inconsolable remorse, tropical heat and heavy liquor, he compromises his work and 
fails the test. The moral force field produces a cleavage or splitting ($) between 
epistemological and bioethical normativity, and he proves unable to maintain his 
integrity by upholding his unconditional allegiance to pure research.
There are dramatic examples in real history of similar conflicts between the roles 
of physician and researcher (between caring for severely ill patients and trying to 
find a magic bullet), for instance in the case of AIDS. Another famous example is 
the discovery of cyclosporine to prevent rejection of organ transplants (Starzl 1967, 
1992/2003). After the heroic first stage of organ transplantation (during the 1950s 
and 1960s), a severe crisis emerged in the 1970s. Implants were rejected, immune 
systems were ruined. Cyclosporine seemed to offer a miracle cure. Prospects for 
patients improved dramatically. But in order for the new product to become avail-
able, it had to be tested in randomised trials, allowing the results from the experi-
mental condition (the saved) to be compared with those of the controls (the doomed).
Martin continues to waver between both roles. Initially, he remains loyal to the 
gospel of randomised trials preached by Gottlieb, but eventually he botches his 
experiment and spoils his results, assuming the role of “saviour” of the desperate. 
The plague disappears from the island, but it is no longer possible to conclusively 
prove that it was the phage vaccine that did the job (as plagues always have the 
tendency to disappear after a while, even in the absence of any biomedical interven-
tion whatsoever).24 Thus, his final big opportunity to acquire everlasting fame is 
thwarted. Martin’s fatal flaw is his incapacity to consistently uphold his loyalty to 
one of these two incommensurable deontologies: the demands of scientific rigour 
versus the principles of professional medical ethics, − even though the deontology 
of science is the dominant one because an Über–Ich is “introjected” (as Freud calls 
it) into his psyche, personified by Gottlieb. He feels haunted by the latter’s critical 
gaze, experiences any concessions to his duties as a physician as moral weakness 
and sees his West Indies expedition as a failure because he puts the well–being of 
people above research (Parry, p. ix).
Beneath his manifest allegiance to Gottlieb, however, a latent oedipal conflict is 
clearly at work as well. Throughout the novel, Martin struggles to distance himself 
from Gottlieb-the-father-figure, attempting to evade the inevitable oedipal collision 
23 Leora dies from smoking a cigarette carelessly left behind by Martin in his lab, infected by spill-
age from a test–tube.
24 “Playing the savior, he had been a traitor to Gottlieb and all that Gottlieb represented … he did 
not have complete proof of the value of the phage … The more they shouted his glory, the more he 
thought about what tight–minded scientists in distant laboratories would say of a man who had had 
his chance and cast it away” (414/5).
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that awaits him should they remain too close. This is what makes him leave the 
(promising) field of bacteriology to become a country doctor: an independent, mar-
ried adult with an income, craving to free himself from the tyranny of “Gottliebism” 
(p. 116). Yet, Gottlieb crosses his path again and Martin, tormented by discontent, 
now eagerly subordinates himself to his found-again father-figure, wasting two long 
years on dreary, repetitive, meaningless lab work, without any output of signifi-
cance. When suddenly the perennial microbial battlefield opens up before his eyes, 
for the first time in biomedical history, Gottlieb proves an excessively stern father, 
notably towards his “favourite” (p. 64), standing in the way between Martin and an 
international academic breakthrough, consciously retarding and discouraging his 
publication, so that the competition over priority is lost. Gottlieb effectively hinders 
Martin to seize the one big opportunity to “make a name for himself”, as Tubbs 
phrases it: gaining international recognition and achieving intellectual indepen-
dence as a department head (a position offered to him by Tubbs, but withdrawn as 
soon as the news of d’Herelle’s publication reaches New York).
This is also reflected by Gottlieb’s comments on this occasion: “Something has 
happened, not altogether bad”. Now that the situation has become untenable, Martin 
is sent on a gloomy errand, all for the glory of Gottlieb himself, whose life-work 
Martin is supposed to fulfil: the St. Hubert expedition. But eventually he is over-
whelmed by anger, resulting in an outburst of masculine oedipal protest: “To Hell 
with experiments! To Hell with Gottlieb!”, as the movie version phrases it.
In this latter scene, university discourse gives way to the discourse of the hys-
teric. Unable to overcome the split between conflicting deontologies, Martin now 
takes the floor as a tormented subject ($ in the upper-left position as agent), raising 
a voice of boisterous protest against the authoritative father-figure (the recipient of 
the message: Gottlieb now acting as S1 in the upper-right position), both practically 
(by compromising his experiment) and verbally (the movie scene):
$ S1
a S2  
This type of discourse tends to be disruptive, but may nonetheless be functional. 
By challenging the “impossible” epistemic regime represented by Gottlieb, a less 
disruptive practice of knowledge production could perhaps emerge (S2 in the lower- 
right position). But in order to achieve this, Martin (the divided subject) must work 
through the question what is really driving his research, his cupido sciendi (a in the 
lower-left position). And precisely this self-reflective deficit is Martin’s ἁμαρτία, 
his tragic fatal flaw. In order to analyse his experiences, he is in need of a therapist. 
Upon his return to New York City, he bursts into Gottlieb’s office to make a full–
fledged “confession”: “I did not add to knowledge. I did the humane thing. I lost 
sight of science”. But this attempt to establish an analytical relationship falters, 
because he can’t get through to Gottlieb anymore, who has become senile, so that 
Martin cannot be “cleansed” (p.  422). Unable to accept his father’s place and 
become his substitute (the position of department head is offered to him, which 
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would reposition him as S2 in the upper-left position), he flees from McGurk for 
good, taking his microscope with him – an item which functions as a phallic sym-
bol, an enabling contrivance, complementing his deficiencies – to follow a fugitive 
colleague into the forest.
This final gesture seems a final escape into Cynicism (in the ancient sense), for 
Cynics were itinerant scholars who already refused all societal roles and responsi-
bilities, which they saw as enslaving, as indicated by their garment: bare feet and a 
rough cloak (Dudley 1967). Martin’s escape into the forest conveys his refusal or 
inability to accept endorsement by the professional, institutional, symbolic order. 
After the death of the father, Martin flees from the role he is expected to play, as well 
as from the claustrophobic embrace of his wealthy spouse, who mothers him and 
bereaves him of what is left of his independence. Beyond the civilised world, he 
wants to come to terms with his own desire. But should we see his “forest science” 
as an attempt at self-analysis, or rather as a relapse into the position of beautiful 
soul, a misguided effort to restore his integrity by withdrawing into “pure” science, 
rather than by trying to work-trough the inevitable conflict?
5.7  A Scientific Walden: The Pastoral of Cabin Science
As a researcher, Martin is torn between the profane world of everyday existence and 
the sacred realm of science. The normal world is depicted in a cynical and sarcastic 
manner. Only heavy drinking allows the hero to survive the imperfections of love, 
marriage and human company, where real-life people oftentimes prove disappoint-
ing and abusive.
Only in the realm of pure science can Martin hope to find purity and precision 
(integrity), instead of sloppiness and contamination (questionable practices or even 
misconduct). These two realms compare to one another as newspapers and popular 
magazines compare to the Journal of Infectious Diseases. But the scientific realm is 
not an innocent world. For here, the death drive reigns: Martin studies bugs in order 
to systematically eradicate them (to destroy these “amiable” pathogenic germs, with 
their “lovely flagella”, p. 41), while staggering numbers of test animals (rabbits and 
guinea pigs) are “sacrificed” on behalf of (often quite pointless) research, without 
any ethical review procedure whatsoever. At a certain point, Martin even starts using 
chimpanzees for a 2 year project that ends in failure, although “murdering monkeys 
proves expensive and grim” (p. 440). And finally, on St. Hubert, human beings are 
sent to death like guinea pigs for the sake of upholding the rigorous logic of ran-
domised trials, represented by a highly charged term: the word “control”,25 – the 
25 “He had learned from Gottlieb the trick of using the word ‘control’ in reference to the person or 
animal or chemical left untreated during an experiment, as a standard for comparison … When a 
physician boasted of his success with this drug or that electric cabinet, Gottlieb always snorted, 
‘Where was your control?’” (p. 43).
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novel’s basic signifier, the most powerful term which Martin as a student adopts 
from Gottlieb, playing a decisive role in the structuring of the plot.
For Martin, the conflict seems unsolvable. One is either a scientist, or a doctor 
(Clarfield 2007). The normal, professional world (‘reality’) is a wasteland of bore-
dom – a waste of time. The “religion” of science promises personal redemption, but 
this can only be achieved by conducting experiments, almost as a “religious exer-
cise” (Löwy 1988), which are inherently destructive.
As a final solution, in a desperate quest for salvation, Martin prefers flight over 
fight, into the forest, the outdoors world, where a self–made cabin laboratory is 
installed. Thus, Martin moves from rural medicine (North Dakota) to public health 
(a small town in Iowa) to bacteriology (a fashionable Chicago clinic) to basic 
research (New York, the ‘ultimate’ city) and finally to “pastoralism” (Doctorow 
2008, p. 456). Here, in a drastically simplified world (in stark contrast to the extrav-
agantly furnished laboratory organization at McGurk),26 he can finally act out his 
ideal of uncontaminated inquiry, albeit in a rather imaginary manner, since life in 
this tiny scientific hermitage (this “shrine”, p.  467) is almost completely out of 
touch with what is happening in the world at large. Here, in isolation, he really 
wants to begin working in earnest, continuously, day and night.27 As a stranded 
researcher he conducts experiments which seem bereft of all purpose. For although 
he seemingly adheres to what Lacan sees as the basic imperative of modern science 
(“Go on, continue to produce more knowledge!; 1991, p. 120), real scientific pro-
ductivity can only happen in a world of social networks.28 In terms of Hegelian 
dialectics, the discourse of the hysteric concurs with the position of the “beautiful 
soul” who rises up against the world in the name of the “law of the heart” (Lacan 
1966, p. 219) but proves unable to deal with the conflicting demands and tensions 
of the real world (the world of contracts, relationships, professional expectations, 
rivalling claims, priority conflicts and so on), and therefore decides to drastically 
simplify life. Only in this manner can Martin live up to his fantasy of pure, uncon-
taminated activity, instilled in him during his student days by Gottlieb.
26 In the novel, but even more so in the film, McGurk is depicted as a streamlined laboratory in a 
futuristic Institute in a futuristic building in a futuristic city: on the uppermost floors of a sky-
scraper, a majestic office building located in the metropolitan quarter from which New York ruled 
the world; a topology emphasising the steep vertical aloofness of ‘top’ science.
27 “When they had worked all night, they came out to find serene dawn lifting across the sleeping 
lake” (p. 468). And when his wife (in a final desperate effort to make him change his mind) seeks 
him out in his hide–out and asks him whether he hasn’t become a bit insane, he answers: “O abso-
lutely! And how I enjoy it!” (p. 469).
28 Cf. the final sentence of the novel: “I feel as if I were really beginning to work now … We’ll plug 
along for 2 or 3 years … and probably we’ll fail” (p. 471).
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5.8  Conclusion: Conflicting Deontologies
Arrowsmith addresses a basic divide running through biomedicine, a clash between 
two (incommensurable) deontologies, two integrity regimes as it were: the princi-
ples of medical ethics on the one hand and the demands of experimental research on 
the other. Although biomedicine is allegedly motivated by the objective to promote 
well-being (enhancing the effectiveness of clinical practice), Arrowsmith empha-
sises that there is another, rather disruptive impulse at work as well: a violent will to 
control life, endangering rather than protecting the well-being, not only of research 
animals, but also of patients and, eventually, of biomedical researchers (such as 
Martin Arrowsmith) themselves. They must choose between two options, both of 
which are presented as morally unsatisfactory: on the one hand medical practice, 
portrayed as fundamentally insincere (permeated by mauvaise foi, to use the 
Sartrean term), on the other hand the methodology of randomised trials, depicted as 
inconsiderate and ruthless. After a series of fiascos, Martin’s “solution” is simplifi-
cation and escape (flight instead of fight).
This raises the question whether this nihilistic portrayal of the moral dichotomy 
is inevitable. Dialectically, the relationship between medical practice and basic 
research may perhaps be seen in a different light. In Arrowsmith, the claim is made 
that, as soon as the principles of biomedical science (M1) are applied to practical 
situations, multiple conflicts and contradictions emerge (M2), but a more sustainable 
and satisfactory outcome would be the awareness that, eventually, the one cannot 
really function without the other (→M3). In splendid isolation, pure science becomes 
thin and empty, so that the plea for “pure” research may actually be an immunisa-
tion strategy, a mechanism of defence (the beautiful soul position). Moreover, it is 
precisely in the confrontation with real-life situations that the relentless drive 
towards control, fuelling the quest for knowledge, is brought to the fore. In other 
words, application and extrapolation are necessary experiences to discover what 
science really is about. The experience of working through the conflict is then seen 
as a precondition for self-understanding.
But this outcome is not easily achieved. The chronic tension is there for real, as 
indicated when we read the novel in terms of the discourse of the analyst:
a $
S2 S1  
The phage is Martin Arrowsmith’s object a: the cause of his desire, that which 
gives meaning to his life, that which makes him move and act. But it also inflicts in 
him a tragic sense of Spaltung ($). Suffering, desperate patients are not his primary 
source of inspiration, and his profession is merely a pretext for his real desire: con-
ducting research. In the exposure to the enigmatic object, professionalism becomes 
suspended (S2 in the lower-left position). What really motivates him is an invisible, 
faceless laboratory phenomenon, inexorable and uncanny, hovering between living 
and non–living (a), and more addictive than heavy liquor. The phage is the one thing 
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he wants to control, but which actually controls him, up to the point of impairment 
($ in the upper-right position). His craving is to transform it into a predictable tool, 
to domesticate it into a normal object, so that university discourse can function 
smoothly again. A working vaccine would have been a perfect outcome in this dis-
ruptive struggle for power between the researcher and his virus ($ ◊ a). In that case, 
the phage would have ended his discontent, his anonymity, by making him famous, 
turning his life into a success story after all. But the idea of medical benefits func-
tions as a façade, a pretext for his urge to dominate nature in her most elementary 
(viral and microbial) dimensions, working himself into a state of neurasthenia – in 
accordance with Dostoyevsky’s insistence that intellectual activity is, in final 
instance, a “disease” (1864/1972, p. 18).
In conclusion, we are not confronted with a moral dilemma in the sense of a 
problem that can be solved by developing or abiding to rules and regulations, such 
as the codes of conduct and ethical principles of research with human subjects. 
Although such practices (developed by professional ethicists) may help to subdue 
the tension, making microbial research more manageable no doubt, they will not 
abolish the basic divide. The desire to control life may become addictive precisely 
because it is driven by a disruptive compulsion. As a science novel, Arrowsmith 
opens up and dramatizes this basic rupture, thus furthering our awareness of the gap 
between what basic research produces and what clinical medicine basically needs. 
And this divide not only affects the knowledge dimension, but the normative dimen-
sion (the level of morality and of the Self) as well. According to Arrowsmith, what 
is considered integrity in the realm of basic research is regarded as misconduct in 
medical practice, and vice versa. But this may not the final word. Arrowsmith is the 
first real science novel, as we have seen. In the next sections we will explore how 
these tensions are addressed in other novels, notably in Chap. 7 (Cantor’s dilemma) 
and Chap. 9 (Intuition).
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